Abstract-This paper shows that the Hirschfeld-GebeleinRényi maximal correlation between the message and the ciphertext provides good secrecy guarantees for cryptosystems that use short keys. We first establish a bound on the eavesdropper's advantage in guessing functions of the message in terms of maximal correlation and the Rényi entropy of the message. This result implies that the maximal correlation is stronger than the notion of entropic security introduced by Russell and Wang. We then show that a small maximal correlation ρ can be achieved via a randomly generated cipher with key length ≈ 2 log(1/ρ), independent of the message length, and by a stream cipher with key length 2 log(1/ρ) + log n + 2 for a message of length n. We establish a converse showing that these ciphers are close to optimal. This is in contrast with the entropic security for which there is a gap between the lower and upper bounds. Finally, we show that a small maximal correlation implies secrecy with respect to several mutual information-based criteria but is not necessarily implied by them. Hence, maximal correlation is a stronger and more practically relevant measure of secrecy than the mutual information.
I. INTRODUCTION

C
ONSIDER the symmetric-key cryptosystem setting in which Alice encrypts a message (plaintext) M of length n bits using a shared secret key K of length s bits into a ciphertext C and sends it to Bob who recovers the message using the ciphertext and the key. The system is said to provide perfect secrecy if the eavesdropper Eve cannot gain any information about the message from the ciphertext C alone, that is, if M and C are independent. Shannon [1] showed that achieving perfect secrecy requires the key to be as long as the message. This result is considered impractical for most cryptographic applications and much shorter keys than the message are commonly used.
To analyze the secrecy of cryptosystems that use short keys, less stringent criteria than perfect secrecy have been proposed. One such criterion is to limit Eve's ability to guess functions of M, by requiring that the difference between Eve's probability of correctly guessing a function f (M) of the message by a function of the ciphertextf (C) and the maximum probability of correctly guessing f (M) without knowledge of C, referred to as the advantage of Eve
to be small. While perfect secrecy is equivalent to requiring the advantage to be less than or equal to zero for all functions of M, we show that requiring the advantage to be less than a small positive value for all functions can be satisfied by keys that are much shorter than the message. In semantic security [2] , a small advantage is required with the additional restriction that Eve uses only probabilistic polynomialtime algorithms. Although satisfied by short keys, proofs of semantic security rely on unproven computational hardness assumptions. The closest work to this paper is entropic security introduced by Russell and Wang [3] and studied by Dodis and Smith [4] , which requires a small advantage assuming the min-entropy of M is large. They proposed several ciphers with short keys that achieve entropic security and established lower bounds on the key length needed to achieve entropic security. Their lower bounds and achievability results do not match, however (refer to Remark 2 in Section IV for details).
In this paper, we show that the Hirschfeld-Gebelein-Rényi maximal correlation [5] - [7] between the message and the ciphertext, defined as
is a natural measure of secrecy for ciphers with short keys. We say that a cipher achieves ρ-maximal correlation secrecy if ρ m (M; C) ≤ ρ when M is uniformly distributed. Ciphers achieving maximal correlation secrecy can guarantee a small advantage. If M is uniformly distributed and f is a one-bit function, e.g., one of the bits of the message, then the relationship between maximal correlation and the advantage follows readily by the work of Witsenhausen [8] . Applying the result by Calmon et al. [9] , the advantage for uniformly distributed M and general f is upper-bounded by ρ.
Maximal correlation has numerous applications in information theory and statistics; see [10] for an overview. The work of Zhao and Chia [11] relates maximal correlation and secret key generation. Asoodeh et al. [12] studied the privacy-utility tradeoff using maximal correlation as a measure of privacy. The role of maximal correlation and principal inertia components in security and privacy was investigated by Calmon et al. [9] , [13] , [14] .
Several other information theoretic secrecy criteria that do not require long keys have also been proposed. Wyner [15] proposed the wiretap channel where Eve observes a noisy version of the ciphertext. Ozarow and Wyner [16] studied the wiretap channel setting in which Eve can choose a subset of the ciphertext bits to observe. In such settings, secrecy criteria based on the mutual information between the message and the eavesdropper's observation (e.g., weak secrecy and strong secrecy [17] - [19] ) are typically used. Semantic security has also been applied to wiretap channels [20] without limitations on Eve's computational power. Massey and Ingemarsson [21] proposed a cipher with a long transmission delay which is secure assuming a memory constraint on Eve. Cachin and Maurer [22] proposed a cipher assuming a memory constraint on Eve, but without long delay. Maurer [23] considered the scenario where Alice, Bob and Eve observe a random source over different noisy channels. Maurer [24] studied the case where there is a large public random source, and the number of bits in the random source that Eve can examine is limited. Calmon et al. [25] , [26] proposed a secrecy criterion called -symbol secrecy which limits Eve's knowledge on subsets of bits of the message. Note that the security criteria in the above works either depend on the bit structure of the message or ciphertext (e.g., noise is applied to the bits in wiretap channel, and -symbol secrecy aims at protecting subsets of bits of the message), or impose a memory constraint. In contrast, ρ-maximal correlation secrecy (like entropic security) does not depend on the bit structure of the message, guaranteeing that the cipher hides every function of the messages (not only bits) equally well from an eavesdropper with unlimited memory and computational power.
The main contributions of this paper, which is an extended and more complete version of [27] , are as follows (also see Figure 1 ).
A. Rényi Entropy Constrained Security
We bound the advantage of Eve using the maximal correlation in scenarios in which the distribution of M is not fixed and Eve may have access to some side information about the message (compared to [9] where the distribution of M is fixed to the one used to evaluate ρ). This allows us to use the same ρ to provide secrecy guarantees for a range of distributions, which is more practical since the distribution of M is often not known in practice. In Section III, we define the notion of Rényi entropy constrained security and show that a ρ-maximal correlation secure cipher also achieves a variant of semantic security with computationally unbounded adversary. In Theorem 1, we show that for non-uniform M, the advantage is upper-bounded by 2 (n−H 2 (M))/2 ρ, where H 2 (M) is the Rényi entropy of M. Therefore we are able to provide secrecy guarantees for a cipher used on data with different pmfs, and even if some partial information about M is provided to Eve. We further show that a small maximal correlation secrecy implies entropic security (refer to Remark 1 in Section III for details). The proof of our result is given in Section VI-B. 
B. Maximal Correlation Secrecy Key Length
In Section IV, we show the surprising result that ρ-maximal correlation secrecy can be achieved by short keys of length independent of the message length. We first establish a converse result showing that every ρ-maximal correlation secure cipher must have a key length s ≥ 2 log(1/ρ) − log 1 + 2 −n ρ −2 bits (Theorem 2). We then show that a cipher constructed using expander graphs can achieve ρ-maximal correlation secrecy with a key length
. We further show that ρ-maximal correlation secrecy can be achieved with high probability via a randomly generated binary additive stream cipher with a key length s = 2 log(1/ρ) + log n + 2 (Theorem 5). These results show that the tradeoff s ≈ 2 log(1/ρ) is optimal for large n. In contrast, the lower bounds on the key length for entropic security is not close to the achievable key length (refer to Remark 2 in Section IV for details). The proofs of these results are given in Section VI. For example, for a 1GB message and a 512-bits key, an advantage can be bounded by ≈ 10 −70 .
C. Relationship to Other Secrecy Criteria
In Section V we show that ρ-maximal correlation secrecy is a stronger measure of secrecy than the notions of strong secrecy [17] , [19] , weak secrecy [15] , and leakage rate [28] , which use the mutual information between the message and the ciphertext. We show that these measures are implied by ρ-maximal correlation secrecy with suitable choices of ρ, but do not imply ρ-maximal correlation secrecy for any ρ < 1.
II. DEFINITIONS AND NOTATION
Throughout this paper, we denote the joint probability matrix of X and Y by P X,Y ∈ R |X |×|Y| . We denote the spectral norm of the matrix A ∈ R m×n as A = max
Av and its Frobenius norm as A F . We denote the m × n matrix consisting of all ones by 1 m×n . The log function is base 2 and the entropy is measured in bits. We use the notation [1 : n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} and Unif(A) to be the uniform probability mass function (pmf) over a finite set A. We consider a cryptosystem that consists of
, M is an n-bit message, unless specified otherwise,
2 n ] unless specified otherwise, and 
where ρ m is as defined in (2) . The encryption function can also be probabilistic. In this case, the ciphertext
is also a function of a random variable W , which is generated using the local randomness at the sender, and is unknown to the receiver and the eavesdropper. The cipher is assumed to be deterministic unless specified otherwise.
III. RÉNYI ENTROPY CONSTRAINED SECURITY
In this section we show that every ρ-maximal correlation secure cipher satisfies a variant of semantic security. Recall that a cipher is said to be semantically secure [29] if for any pmf p(m) on M, any function f (m), and any partial information function h(m) of the message, if M is generated according to p(m), the eavesdropper who observes the ciphertext C and h(M) (and also knows the choices of n, p, f and h) cannot correctly guess f (M) using a probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithm with probability nonnegligibly higher than the best probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithm for guessing f (M) using only h(M) (and also the choices of n, p, f and h). In other words, the eavesdropper cannot improve the probability of guessing f (M) correctly by observing C. Note that the definition in [29] allows p(m) to be a pmf on messages with different lengths. For simplicity, we consider p(m) to be a pmf on messages with the same length n.
We assume p(m) is a pmf on message with the same length n, and leave out the computational complexity assumptions on p, f and h here since they are not the main concern of this paper.
Rényi entropy constrained security is a variant of semantic security in which we remove the limitation on computational power but restrict the choice of the pmf p(m) to have a large Rényi entropy H 2 (M) (or equivalently a small χ 2 -divergence [30] from the uniform pmf), that is,
for some t ≥ 0. It is formally defined below.
Definition 1: A cipher is said to be (t, )-Rényi entropy constrained secure if for any pmf p(m) with H 2 (M) ≥ t, any function f (m) of the message, and any eavesdropper's guess f (c) of f (m), when the message M is generated according to p(m), the advantage as defined in (1) is bounded as
) is often used in cryptography. In particular, entropic security [3] requires that the message has a high min-entropy. Rényi entropy constrained security imposes a less stringent requirement on the message since H 2 (M) ≥ H ∞ (M), hence any message with high H ∞ (M) also has a high H 2 (M). The case of partial information h(m) will be addressed later.
We now show that maximal correlation secrecy implies Rényi entropy constrained security.
Theorem 1: A ρ-maximal correlation secure cipher is (t, )-Rényi entropy constrained secure for any t ≥ 0 and
Moreover, if the choice of f (m) is restricted to one-bit functions f (m) ∈ {0, 1}, then the advantage is bounded by
The proof of this theorem is given in Section VI-B. Note that ρ is always measured assuming the pmf of the message is uniform, though the theorem shows that ρ can also be used to bound the advantage when the actual p(m) is non-uniform. Also note that the value of n − t corresponds to the deviation of p(m) from the uniform distribution, and can be very small when p(m) is close to uniform. The work in [9] , which implies Adv ≤ ρ m (M; C), also relates the advantage in guessing functions to maximal correlation (measured using the actual distribution p(m)). The main difference between Theorem 1 and the result in [9] is that in Theorem 1, the actual distribution p(m) (where the advantage is measured) does not need to be the same as the distribution of the message used in measuring ρ (which is always set to uniform). This allows us to use the same ρ to give guarantees for a range of distributions p(m).
The Rényi entropy constrained security can be extended to scenarios in which partial information h(m) is available to Eve. We restrict the choices of p(m) and h(m) to satisfy the condition
where τ ≥ 0 is a constant and
, and the advantage is now defined as
where the second term is the probability of guessing f (M) correctly using the maximum a posteriori estimation of f (M) given h(M). As a consequence of Theorem 1, for a ρ-maximal correlation secure cipher, the advantage is upper bounded by
The value of ρ directly corresponds to the eavesdropper advantage and the correct probability of the eavesdropper's guess. For example, if the message M is uniformly distributed, (i.e., t = n), then the eavesdropper cannot correctly guess any one-bit function such that P{ f (M) = 1} = 1/2 with probability larger than (1 + ρ) /2. As another example, if M is uniformly distributed and l bits of M (at fixed positions) are provided to the eavesdropper via the partial information h(m), then the advantage of the eavesdropper is upper bounded by 2 l/2 ρ.
To illustrate our results, suppose we wish to protect a message of length n = 8 × 10 9 (i.e., 1GB) with a key of length s = 512. By Theorem 5, we can achieve ρ-maximal correlation secrecy for ρ = 1.54 × 10 −72 using a binary additive stream cipher. As a result, if M is uniformly distributed, then the advantage of the eavesdropper is upper bounded by 1.54 × 10 −72 . If l = 100 bits of M are provided to the eavesdropper, then the advantage is bounded by 1.74 × 10 −57 . We can see that a cipher with key length much shorter than the message length can provide good security guarantees.
Remark 1: We can show that ρ-maximal correlation secrecy implies (t, )-entropic security (as defined in [4] ) for = 2 (n−t )/2 ρ. In fact the implication holds even when the min-entropy H ∞ (M) in entropic security is replaced by Rényi entropy H 2 (M), i.e., for any pmf p(m) of M with H 2 (M) ≥ t, and any functionf (c), there exists a random variableF independent of M such that for any function f (m),
and the difference can be quite large if one of the messages has a high probability, maximal correlation secrecy can be much stronger than entropic security. The proof is given in Section VI-B.
IV. MAXIMAL CORRELATION SECRECY KEY LENGTH
We provide bounds on the key length of a ρ-maximal correlation secure cipher in terms of ρ and the message length n. We first establish the following lower bound on the key length.
Theorem 2: If a cipher is ρ-maximal correlation secure, then its key length is lower bounded as
The proof of this theorem is given in Section VI-C. Note that when ρ > 0, this lower bound can be written as
which approaches 2 log(1/ρ) as n tends to infinity. Also note that this bound applies to any ciphertext length (not necessarily equal to message length) and to probabilistic encryption functions.
We now consider a construction of a cipher with key length close to the lower bound using expander graphs similar to [4] and [31] . Let G be a d-regular graph with vertices [1 :
, where E is a labeling of the edges of G. The graph may be a multigraph with multiple instances of the same edge, and we assume the graph is undirected, i.e., the number of edges (m, c) is the same as the number of edges (c, m) . Further assume the labeling is invertible, i.e., there exists function D(k, c) such E(k, m) 
Such a graph is referred to as an expander graph if the magnitude of the second largest eigenvalue (in absolute value) of A
is small. An expander graph can be constructed explicitly. For example, a (non-bipartite) Ramanujan graph [32] has a second eigenvalue
Given an expander graph, we can define a corresponding expander graph cipher with M = C = [1 :
m), and decryption function D(k, c).
We now find the maximal correlation for such an expander graph cipher.
Theorem 3: The cipher defined by an expander graph with adjacency matrix A has maximal correlation
ρ m (M; C) = 1 d |λ 2 (A)|.
As a result, the cipher corresponding to a non-bipartite Ramanujan graph is ρ-maximal correlation secure if
where s = log d corresponds to the key length if it is an integer.
The proof of this theorem is given in Section VI-D. It is a consequence of the characterization of maximal correlation in [8] . The relationship between maximal correlation and the second eigenvalue of a graph is also studied in [33] . A limitation of this construction is that there may not be constructions of Ramanujan graphs for a desired n and s. Using the result in [34] on the second eigenvalue of random regular graphs, we can show the existence of maximal correlation secure ciphers with key lengths close to the lower bound for any large enough n and s.
Theorem 4: There exists a ρ-maximal correlation secure cipher with message length n ≥ 2 and key length s ≥ 2 if
where α > 0 is a constant.
The following corollary provides a bound on s which is independent of n. Corollary 1: There exists a ρ-maximal correlation secure cipher with message length n ≥ 2 and key length s ≥ 2 if
,
The proofs of Theorem 4 and Corollary 1 are in Section VI-E. This corollary shows that for any ρ, a key length which depends only on ρ is sufficient to achieve ρ-maximal correlation secrecy for any message length. This is in a strong contrast to perfect secrecy, which requires the key length to be at least the message length.
Maximal correlation secrecy can also be achieved by a simpler cipher with a sightly longer key length. Consider a binary additive stream cipher
n is the keystream generator and ⊕ is component-wise mod 2 addition. The following theorem shows that most binary additive stream ciphers with slightly longer key than the lower bound in Theorem 2 are ρ-maximal correlation secure.
where the randomness of ρ m (M; M ⊕ G(K )) is induced by the random keystream generator, if the key length
The proof of this theorem is given in Section VI-F. Substituting = 1 in the theorem shows that there exists a binary additive stream cipher that is ρ-maximal correlation secure with a key length
Hence for a constant ρ > 0, a key size of around log n is sufficient. Figure 2 plots the lower bound on the key length in Theorem 2, the key length achievable by the expander graph cipher using the Ramanujan graphs in Theorem 3, and the key length achievable by the random stream cipher in Theorem 5 versus ρ for n = 10000.
Remark 2: By the achievability result in Theorem 3 where s = 2 log(1/ρ) + 2, there exist ciphers which achieve (t, )-Rényi entropy constrained security with key length
This is the same key length required by entropic security in [4] (Corollary 3.3). Since (t, )-Rényi entropy constrained security implies (t, )-entropic security, it is possible to show the achievability result of entropic security via maximal correlation. Also note that unlike maximal correlation secrecy where there are tight upper and lower bounds on the optimal key length s ≈ 2 log(1/ρ) for large n, the lower bounds on the key length given in [4] :
for any entropically secure cipher, and
for public-coin schemes, are much smaller than the achievable key length. It is conjectured in [4] that the achievable key length is tight.
V. RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER SECRECY CRITERIA
In this section, we compare maximal correlation secrecy to other secrecy criteria that use the mutual information I (M; C) between the message M and the ciphertext C. We show that ρ-maximal correlation secrecy is stronger than these other secrecy criteria as they are implied by ρ-maximal correlation secrecy with suitable choices of ρ, but they do not imply ρ-maximal correlation secrecy for any ρ < 1.
As pointed out by Maurer [17] , mutual information is too loose a criterion if it is not required to approach zero because it does not guarantee hiding any bit (or more generally any function) of the message. For an n bit message and an s-bit key the mutual information is lower bounded as I (M; C) ≥ n − s and this bound can be achieved simply by encrypting the most significant s bits of M perfectly and sending the rest of the bits in the clear. Hence unless s ≥ n, mutual information cannot guarantee that any bit of M is not leaked. There are other ciphers that can achieve the same minimum mutual information but ensure better secrecy. For example, suppose we wish to encrypt a 2-bit message M ∼ Unif({0, 1, 2, 3}) using a 1-bit key K ∼ Bern(1/2). Let C 1 = M + 2K mod 4 be the cipher which encrypts only the most significant bit of the message and C 2 = M + K mod 4 be another cipher that achieves I (M; C) = 1. It is easy to see that using C 2 , Eve cannot correctly guess any bit of the message with probability greater than 3/4 signifying that C 2 provides better secrecy than C 1 . Moreover the second cipher achieves lower maximal correlation ρ m (M; C 2 ) = √ 2/2 than the first ρ m (M; C 1 ) = 1, hence maximal correlation is a better measure of secrecy than mutual information.
We now formalize the relationship between maximal correlation secrecy and the mutual information secrecy measures of strong secrecy [17] , weak secrecy [15] , and leakage rate [28] . By the following proposition which follows from Theorem 5 in [35] , a ρ-maximal correlation secrecy guarantees a small mutual information.
Proposition 1: Let X and Y be two discrete random variables, then
In the following we assume that M ∼ Unif([1 : 2 n ]), which reduces (3) to
We now use the above proposition to compare ρ-maximal correlation secrecy to secrecy criteria that use the mutual information.
A. Strong Secrecy
This criterion requires that lim n→∞ I (M; C) = 0. From (4) this is implied by ρ-maximal correlation secrecy for
B. Weak Secrecy
This criterion requires that lim n→∞ I (M; C)/n = 0. From (4), this is implied by ρ-maximal correlation secrecy for
C. Leakage Rate
Note that both weak and strong secrecy require the key rate lim n s/n = 1. By requiring that lim n I (M; C)/n ≤ R L for some leakage rate R L , a key rate of 1 − R L can be achieved. From (4), this is implied by ρ-maximal correlation secrecy for
Note that Theorem 5 implies that such ρ can be achieved also by a key rate of 1 − R L . Hence maximal correlation secrecy provides a better security guarantee than leakage rate with no penalty on the key rate.
The above results show that ρ-maximal correlation secret implies secrecy criteria involving mutual information. We now show that a small I (M; C) does not necessarily imply ρ-maximal correlation secrecy. Consider the following cipher: Let M = C = K = [0 : 2 n − 1], and the encryption and decryption functions be
and D(k, c) = E(−k, c). Direct computation yields
), which goes to zero as n tends to infinity, and thus the cipher satisfies strong secrecy. However, since one can determine if M = 2 n − 1 or not by observing C, ρ m (M; C) = 1. Hence ρ-maximal correlation secrecy is a strictly stronger secrecy criterion than criteria that use mutual information.
VI. PROOF OF THE RESULTS
A. Properties of Maximal Correlation
We use a characterization of maximal correlation in terms of the spectral norm that follows directly from the singular value characterization of maximal correlation in [8] .
Lemma 1: Let (X, Y ) ∼ p(x, y) be discrete random variables with marginals p(x) and p(y). Define the matrix B ∈ R |X |×|Y| with entries
Then,
Next we state a result relating maximal correlation and the χ 2 -divergence between the joint pmf and the product of the marginal pmfs, also known as χ 2 measure of correlation which follows directly from [9] .
Lemma 2: Let (X, Y ) ∼ p(x, y) be discrete random variables with marginals p(x) and p(y). Then,
where
is the χ 2 -divergence between p(x) and q(x).
B. Proof of Theorem 1
We prove Theorem 1, which shows that maximal correlation secrecy implies Rényi entropy constrained security. First prove the case for general functions f (m). Note that it is implied by the following more general result.
Proposition 2: Consider any two pmfs p M (m) andp M (m) on M, and a Markov kernel p C|M (c|m). The two pmfs induce the joint probability measures P andP on (M, C), respectively. Let ρ m (M; C) be the maximal correlation in P.
For any functions f
Proof: All expectations, variances and covariances in this proof are in P. Assume the range of f (m) is {1, ..., l}.
Hence there exists constant z l 1 such that
We have
The result follows.
To obtain Theorem 1, take P to be the uniform distribution on M andP to be the actual distribution. The result follows
To show the result in Remark 1, takeF to be a random variable in the probability spaceP independent of M witĥ P{F = i } = P{f (C) = i }, then the result follows from
Then we prove a slightly better result for one-bit functions f (m). Note that it is implied by the following more general result.
Proposition 3: Consider any two pmfs p M (m) andp M (m) on M, and a Markov kernel p C|M (c|m).
The two pmfs induce the joint probability measures P andP on (M, C), respectively. Let ρ m (M; C) be the maximal correlation in P. For any one-bit functions f : M → {0, 1} andf : C → {0, 1}, we havê
Proof: All expectations, variances and covariances in this proof are in P. Let g(m) = (−1) 
where the last inequality is due top e < min{p f (0),p f (1)} and
for any a, b such that |a| > |b| and −1 < x < 1. Hence,
The result follows. To prove Theorem 1 for one-bit functions f (m), note that by Proposition 3,
This completes the proof.
C. Proof of Theorem 2
Here we assume the ciphertext length is arbitrary, and the encryption function can be randomized, i.e., the ciphertext is
is the local randomness at the sender. We require that D(k, E(k, m, w)) = m for any k, m, w. From Lemma 2,
Hence,
D. Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3 is a direct consequence of Lemma 1. Since
Ramanujan graphs have second eigenvalue
As a result, if log d ≥ 2 log(1/ρ)+2, we have ρ m (M; C) ≤ ρ.
E. Proofs of Theorem 4 and Corollary 1
We first prove a lemma on the cascade of two ciphers with the same message length n but with possibly different key lengths s 1 and s 2 , which yields a cipher with message length n and key length s 1 + s 2 . 
Then we have
Proof: Consider the following alternate characterization of maximal correlation in [7] 
Note that for any f, g : [1 :
The result follows. Now consider the following result from [34] . Let A 1 , . . . , A d ∈ R N×N be i.i.d. random permutation matrices uniformly distributed in the set of permutations of {1, . . . , N}. Then we have
We use the above result to construct a cipher as follows.
Hence by (5) , there exist fixed σ 1 , . . . , σ d and a constant η > 0 (that does not depend on s or n) such that 2 and n/ log n ≥ 4ηd, or equivalently, 2 log η + 5 ≤ s ≤ log n − log log n − log η − 1.
Note that this construction only works for very short key lengths. We now provide a construction for general key length s by the cascade of several ciphers with short key lengths. Let ≤ log n − log log n − log η − 1.
Hence by (6) and Lemma 3, the maximal correlation of the resultant cipher is
where 2t = 2 s log n − log log n − log η − 2 ≤ 2s log n − log log n − log η − 2 + 2 ≤ 2s log n − log log n − (log n − log log n) /5 + 2 = 5s/2 log n − log log n + 2 ≤ 4s log n + 2, where the last inequality is due to log n ≥ log s 0 ≥ 14. Therefore, + α log(1/ρ) log(log(1/ρ) + 1)
where the last step is due to the assumption that n > s. This complete the proof of Corollary 1.
F. Proof of Theorem 5
We first compute the maximal correlation of a binary additive stream cipher. The following proposition follows by Fourier analysis of Boolean functions [36] ; see [13] . This completes the proof of Theorem 5.
